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The focus of this paper is the recent revival of interest in structuralist approaches to 
science and, in particular, the structural realist position in philosophy of science1. The 
challenge facing scientific structuralists is three-fold: i) to characterize scientific theories 
in ‘structural’ terms, and to use this characterization ii) to establish a theory-world 
connection2 (including an explanation of applicability) and iii) to address the relationship 
of ‘structural continuity’ between predecessor and successor theories. Our aim is to 
appeal to the notion of shared structure between models to reconsider all of these 
challenges, and, in so doing, to classify the varieties of scientific structuralism and to 
offer a ‘minimal’ construal that is best viewed from a methodological stance. 
 
1 Structuralism in Mathematics 
 
Since much of what is taken as distinctive of scientific structuralism is tied to 
mathematical structuralism, we begin first with a brief description of what we mean by 
this. We take mathematical structuralism to be the following philosophical position: the 
subject matter of mathematics is structured systems3 and their morphology, so that  
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• mathematical ‘objects’ are nothing but ‘positions in structured systems’, and  
• mathematical theories aim to describe such objects and systems by their shared 
structure, i.e., by their being instances of the same kind of structure.  
 
For example, the theory of natural numbers, as framed by4 the Peano axioms, describes 
the various concrete5 systems that have a Natural-Number structure. These structured 
systems are, for example, the von Neumann ordinals, the Zermelo numerals, and so forth; 
they are models (in the Tarskian sense of the term6) of the Natural-Number structure. The 
‘objects’ that the theory of natural numbers talks about are then the positions in the 
various models. For example, the von Neumann ordinal ‘2’ is a position in the model 
‘von Neumann ordinals’; the Zermelo numeral ‘2’ is a position in the model ‘Zermelo 
numerals’; and the theory of natural numbers describes the number ‘2’ in terms of the 
shared structure of these, and other, models that have the same kind of structure. If all 
models that exemplify this structure are isomorphic, then the Natural-Number structure 
and its morphology are said to present its kinds of objects7, i.e., are said to determine its 
‘objects’ only ‘up to isomorphism’.  
 
As explained by Benacerraf [1965], mathematical structuralism implies that there are no 
natural numbers as particular objects, i.e., as existing things whose ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ 
can be individuated independently of the role they play in a structured system of a given 
kind. This is because the relevant criterion of individuation, viz., Leibniz’s Principle of 
the Identity of Indiscernibles, does not hold. For example, in one system of the natural 
numbers the property 2∈4 holds for the natural number ‘2’ while in another it does not. 
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Yet clearly, since the systems are isomorphic, we want to say that we are talking about 
the same natural number ‘2’. In our terminology, we express this by saying that we are 
talking about ‘2’ as a kind of object. More generally, we say that there are only 
mathematical ‘objects’ as kinds of objects, i.e., that there are ‘objects’ that can be 
individuated only up to isomorphism as positions in a structured system of a given kind. 
Thus, taking ‘structured system’ to mean ‘model’8, we say that a mathematical theory, 
while framed by its axioms9, can be characterized by its models, and that the kinds of 
objects that the theory talks about can be characterized by their being positions in models 
that have the same kind of structure.  
 
In the next section we use this admittedly brief sketch of mathematical structuralism as a 
starting point for elucidating what might be meant by scientific structuralism. There are 
two points, important for the contrast between mathematical and scientific structuralism, 
that enable us to further clarify our subsequent description of scientific structuralism. 
First, in physical theorizing it is important to keep clear the semantic distinction between 
kinds of objects and particular objects. As noted above, in mathematics this distinction is 
not possible; mathematical objects are kinds of objects rather than particular objects. This 
is what it means to say that mathematical ‘objects’ are characterized only by what can be 
said of their shared structure. When we speak about the natural number ‘2’ we do not 
intend to refer to (or mean) any particular instance of the natural number 2. For example, 
we do not intend to refer to the ordinal ‘2’; rather, we are speaking about any kind of 
object that has the appropriate kind of structure.  
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A second difference is that in physical theorizing we also need the ontological distinction 
between theoretical objects and their physical realization. Thus, we need to maintain a 
level of description in which a physical theory can talk about electrons, as theoretical 
objects, without its having to be about electrons, as objects that are physically realized in 
the world. To talk about electrons (or unicorns) is not thereby to bring them into 
existence as physical objects. Again, in mathematics there is no such distinction; for a 
sentence to be about an object is for a sentence to talk about an object. For example, for a 
theory to be about the natural number 2 it is sufficient for it to talk (in a coherent 
manner10) about the natural number 2. Thus, for a mathematical object, ‘to be’, as Quine 
[1980] explains, is to be a value in the range of a bound variable. 
 
We rely on the terminology of ‘presentation’ versus ‘representation’ to express these 
important distinctions. At the semantic level, we say that in mathematics the kinds of 
objects that the theory talks about are presented via the shared structure holding between 
the mathematical models. For example, the ‘2’ of the von Neumann ordinals and the ‘2’ 
of the Zermelo numerals are presented as the same kind of object, i.e., as the natural 
number 2, because the models in which they are positions have the same structure. 
Likewise for physical theories – theoretical objects, as kinds of physical objects, may be 
presented via the shared structure holding between the theoretical models. However, at 
the ontological level, a physical theory, insofar as it is successful11, must also represent 
particular physical objects and/or phenomena and not merely present kinds of physical 
objects. In what follows we shall have more to say about the implications of keeping 
issues of semantics/presentation separate from issues of ontology/representation. 
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2 Structuralism in Science: An Analogy with the Mathematical  
 
What is scientific structuralism? That is, in what sense can we claim that “science is the 
search for structure”12? Analogous to mathematical structuralism, one might say that, 
minimally, scientific structuralism is the view that the subject matter of science is 
structured systems and their morphology, so that  
 
• scientific ‘objects’ are presented as nothing but ‘positions in structured systems’, and  
• scientific theories aim to describe such objects and such systems by their same or 
shared structure, i.e. by their being instances of the same kind of structure.  
 
If, once again, we replace the term ‘structured system’ with ‘model’, and recall that 
‘objects’ are kinds of objects, then scientific structuralism can be described as the position 
that a scientific theory may be characterized by the collection of its theoretical models 
and that the kinds of objects that the theory talks about can be characterized as being 
‘positions in a theoretical model’.  
 
Since the current scientific structuralist debates are (for the most part) framed within the 
‘semantic view of theories’, our investigation will also be set within that framework. For 
our present purposes, the most important differences between the syntactic and semantic 
views arise through consideration of both the structure of scientific theories and the 
theory-world connection.  
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On the syntactic view of theories, a theory is an uninterpreted, or partially interpreted, 
axiom system plus correspondence rules, or co-ordinating definitions, that mediate so as 
to provide for the theory-world connection, e.g., that are used to provide a bridge between 
theoretical sentences and observational sentences. The semantic view of theories rejects 
the need for, and/or possibility of, correspondence rules and instead uses models (again, 
in the Tarskian sense of the term) to provide an unmediated theory-world connection. 
One may13 then forgo the need for a precise axiomatization of the theory in favor of 
making precise the sense of model, so that a theory, even if framed by axioms, is 
characterized by a collection of its models.14
 
According to a more radical version of the semantic view, a scientific theory need not be 
axiomatized, or even axiomatizable; instead all emphasis is to be placed on models. A 
theory is a collection of models. Thus, to establish a theory-world connection we need 
only connect its models to the world. Since such models can clearly no longer be 
understood in the purely Tarskian sense, i.e., since one gives up any description of the 
theory in terms of axioms or sets of sentences and, thereby, forgoes taking ‘model’ to 
mean an interpretation that satisfies a set of sentences, this raises questions about what is 
meant by ‘model’ on this more radical view (see Jones [2005]). To side-step these 
questions, some have turned to characterize a theory more broadly as a family of 
structures15, wherein a model is a type of structure. The issue of what, precisely, is meant 
on this approach by the terms ‘model’ or ‘structure’ is one we will not go into at this 
point.  
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Regardless of whether one adopts a syntactic or semantic view of scientific theories, the 
lesson that we believe scientific structuralists ought to draw from the analogy with 
mathematical structuralism can be summarized as follows: the ‘objects’ of a scientific 
theory are kinds of physical objects (rather than particular physical objects) and they are 
presented (rather than represented) by considering the shared structure of the models of 
the theory16.  
  
3 Applications of Shared Structure 
 
In our consideration of mathematical structuralism, we have seen that the notion of 
‘shared structure’ between models of a given theory can be appealed to in presenting the 
kinds of objects that the theory talks about. We have seen too that according to the 
semantic view of scientific theories, theories (regardless of how, or whether, they are 
formally framed) are to be characterized as a collection of models that share the same 
kind of structure. This application of shared structure speaks to the first challenge facing 
the scientific structuralist, viz., to characterize scientific theories in ‘structural’ terms, and 
so we are now in a position to reconsider the remaining challenges by relying on the 
notion of shared structure to account for the uses of this characterization.  
 
The first use is the attempt to capture the theory-world connection by appealing to the 
relationship of shared17 structure between the theory and the phenomena. For example, as 
Suppes has pointed out ([1960]; [1962]), scientific theorizing consists of “a hierarchy of 
theories and their models” (Suppes [1962], p. 255) that bridge the gap between the high 
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level theory and the lower level phenomena that the theory is intended to be about. There 
is a theory, characterized by the collection of its models, associated with each layer (e.g., 
there is a high level theory, a theory of the experiment, a theory of the data) so that the 
relationship of shared structure between each layer (e.g., between the theory and the data) 
can be formally analyzed and experimentally evaluated18. So arranged, the formal 
analysis (by model-theoretic methods) of the relationship between the theory and the 
phenomena aims to close the gaps between the levels, for example, the gap between the 
high level theory and the theory of the data, by appealing to isomorphisms19 to formally 
express the claim that their models have the same structure.  
 
It is important to note that data models, for Suppes, are models in the Tarskian sense – 
they are models of a theory of data. As such, data models are far removed from ‘mere 
descriptions of what is observed’, i.e., from what we might call ‘the phenomena’20. As 
Suppes notes, “the precise definition of models of data for any given experiment requires 
that there be a theory of data in the sense of the experimental procedure, as well as in the 
ordinary sense of the empirical theory of the phenomena being studied”. (Suppes [1962, 
p. 253) Thus, two things are required to connect the high level theory to the phenomena: 
an experimental theory of the data and an empirical theory of the phenomena.  
 
Suppes ([1960], [1962] and [1967]) details the evaluative criteria of those theories 
(theories of experimental design and of ceteris paribus conditions) that go into the 
construction of the experimental theory of the data. But, he is clear that, since there are no 
models (in the Tarskian sense) of these theories, one can formally characterize the 
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experimental theory of the data only by the collection of its data models; and so one’s 
formal analysis must begin with models of data. To then connect the data to the 
phenomena one must establish that their models have the same structure. But without an 
(empirical) theory of the phenomena, one cannot speak of the structure of the phenomena, 
i.e., one cannot characterize the structure of the phenomena in terms of the shared 
structure of its models. Suppes, however, is silent on the issue of why we should suppose 
that models of data have the same structure as the phenomena.  
 
It is here, then, that we are presented with three options: i) from a methodological stance, 
we may forgo talk of the structure of the phenomena and simply begin with structured 
data, i.e., with data models; ii) from an empirical stance we may say that what structures 
the phenomena into data models is the high level theory; and finally, iii) from a realist 
stance we may say that what structures the phenomena is the world.21 Regardless of one’s 
stance, it should be clear that without a theory of the phenomena one cannot formalize the 
treatment of the structure of the phenomena in terms of data models alone, and so one 
cannot use the semantic view’s account of shared structure between models to 
immediately close the gap between the theory and the phenomena, and thereby to 
establish a theory-world connection.  
 
Data models, then, represent a significant cut-off point in our formal analysis; below the 
level of data models we require more than comparisons of shared structure between 
models to relate the levels of the hierarchy to one another. In recognition of this we 
separate the scientific structuralist’s second challenge (to establish a theory-world 
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connection) into two components: a) to give an account of applicability in terms of the 
shared structure between models of the theory and data models wherein models of the 
theory present the kinds of objects that the data models are intended to talk about so that 
their ‘objects’ have the same kind of structure, and b) to give an account of 
representation in terms of the shared structure between data models and the phenomena 
so that the phenomena that the theory is about are appropriately structured (by the theory 
or by the world).  
 
The second use of the characterization of a scientific theory as a collection of its models 
is the appeal to the notion of shared structure to reconsider the relationship between 
predecessor and successor theories. This relationship is of crucial interest to structural 
realists in their attempt to overcome the so-called ‘pessimistic meta-induction’ argument 
and, in so doing, to make way for a modified version of the ‘no miracles’ argument. The 
‘pessimistic meta-induction’ argument relies upon the existence of radical ontological 
discontinuities between predecessor and successor theories, and the strategy for 
overcoming the associated pessimism, as proposed by Worrall [1989], depends on the 
claim that the discontinuity at the ontological level is nonetheless accompanied by overall 
continuity at the structural level.  
 
In support of the assertion of ‘structural continuity’ between predecessor and successor 
theories, Worrall points out that, for example, the mathematical equations of the 
Newtonian theory of gravitation can, in a rough and ready way22 be retrieved, in the 
appropriate limit, from Einstein’s general theory of relativity. Continuity of structure (as 
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expressed by the equations) is maintained despite the fact that the two theories disagree 
over such ontological issues as the nature of material bodies (e.g., the meaning of the 
term ‘mass’), whether or not material bodies act directly and instantaneously on one 
another at a distance, and whether or not space and time are themselves influenced by the 
presence of material bodies. The suggestion is that, by restricting ourselves to the 
relationship of shared structure between predecessor and successor theories, we are able 
to recover the needed continuity through radical theory change, and so are in a position to 
offer-up a structural realist version of the ‘no miracles’ argument.  
 
For the structural realist, read now as a kind of scientific structuralist, the point of the 
above example is that this relationship can be expressed in terms of shared structure 
between the models (e.g., the solutions) of Einstein’s equations and those of the 
Newtonian theory of gravitation. More generally, characterizing a theory as a collection 
of models allows one to account for structural continuity by appealing to the shared 
structure between models of the predecessor theory and models of the successor theory.  
 
Various attempts have been made to formally capture each of these three applications of 
shared structure by specifying a particular type of ‘structure’, and hence, a particular type 
of morphism that should hold between models as types of ‘structures’. For the first 
application, i.e., characterizing the structure of a scientific theory in terms of the shared 
structure of its models, Da Costa and French [1990], for example, appeal to partial 
isomorphisms between models, as types of partial structures, so that a scientific theory is 
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“its class of (mathematical) models, regarded as the structures it makes available for 
modeling its domain”. (Da Costa and French [1990], p. 259)  
 
Accounts of the second application of shared structure, i.e., using the above 
characterization of theories to capture the relationship between (models of) the theory and 
(models of) the phenomena, have been offered in terms of: 
 
a) isomorphisms between either models as Tarskian models (Suppes [1967]) or 
models as state-spaces interpreted by Beth semantics (van Fraassen [1970] and 
Suppe [1977]),  
b) partial isomorphisms between models as partial structures (French and Da Costa 
[1990]), and  
c) embeddability either of  empirical substructures and structures as state-spaces (van 
Fraassen [1980] or of partial structures and simple pragmatic structures in a 
function-space (French [1999]).  
 
Nevertheless, as we have seen explicitly in our investigation of Suppes, while capturing 
the relation between theory and data models may be formally tractable, there still remains 
a gap between the data models and the phenomena that cannot be bridged in the same 
‘formal’ manner. This issue, fundamentally the issue of how data models represent the 
structure of the phenomena, should thus be pressed with respect to each of a) through c). 
 
Version: 28/01/2005  12 
Finally, attempts to formally capture the relation of ‘structural continuity’ between 
predecessor and successor theories by appealing to the shared structure of their respective 
models (again, as types of ‘structures’) have been made in terms of: 
 
a) homeomorphisms between types of lattice structures (Da Costa, Bueno, French 
[1997]),  
b) partial isomorphisms between partial structures in a function-space (French 
[1999]), and  
c) partial homomorphisms between partial structures (French [2000]).  
 
What remains open for discussion here, and what underlies the structural realism debates, 
is the question of whether the kind of structure that is retained is theoretical 
(mathematical) or phenomenological23; do we read the appropriate kind of structure from 
the theory or from the world? Forgoing this question for the moment, in each case, what 
the success of the three applications relies upon is an attempt to make formally precise 
the notion of ‘shared structure’. It is thought that “without a formal framework for 
explicating this concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s notion 
of similarity between models does…” (French [2000], p. 114). What all of these ‘formal’ 
attempts have in common, then, is that they seek to specify the type of shared structure at 
work in terms of some specific type of morphism between models as some specific type 
of ‘structure’, e.g., in terms of isomorphism, embeddability, partial isomorphism, 
homomorphism between Tarskian models, state-spaces, partial structures, etc.  
Version: 28/01/2005  13 
This is not our approach. We wish to distinguish between what shared structure is (what 
specific type of structure and/or type of morphism is the appropriate one24) and what the 
presence of shared structure tells us (what the appropriate kind of structure is for the task 
at hand), and to place our focus on the latter. We say simply that two models share 
structure if there exists a morphism between them that preserves the ‘appropriate kind’ of 
structure, regardless of our having to specify this kind as a precise type of morphism. The 
‘appropriate kind’ of structure depends on which of the three applications of the notion of 
shared structure is being appealed to, and also on the details of the particular task at hand. 
Thus, and this is where our emphasis is distinct, what shared structure tells us cannot be 
ascertained simply by looking at the types of ‘structures’ (or types of morphisms): the 
proof of the efficacy of appeals to shared structure is in the pudding, not in the recipe.  
 
Given our more modest approach, we draw the following general conclusions concerning 
the appeal to shared structure for each challenge faced by scientific structuralists.  
 
(1) By characterizing a scientific theory as a collection of models, shared structure 
between the theoretical models of a theory tells us what kinds of objects the 
theory talks about.  
 
For example, given Newton’s laws of motion and his law of universal gravitation, we can 
solve the generic two-body problem. These solutions are models of the theory, and they 
prescribe all and only the possible paths for Newtonian inertial-gravitational objects in 
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two-body motion. In doing so, they thereby present the kind of object that the theory talks 
about, viz., a ‘Newtonian inertial-gravitational’ object.25  
 
Turning next to consider an example from quantum theory, French ([2000], p. 107) writes 
that for Weyl, the shared group-structure of quantum theoretical models tells us how the 
kinds of objects that quantum theory talks about are to be structured so as to satisfy a 
global form of the Heisenberg commutation relations (see French [2000], p. 107). This 
speaks to Weyl’s ‘foundationalist’ programme (see Mackey [1993]).  
 
French’s reconstruction of this programme suggests that it was by appeal to a particular 
type of structure and type of morphism that the gap between the group theoretic and the 
quantum theoretic systems was bridged. However, as he himself writes, it was “the 
reciprocity between the permutation and linear groups” that acted “as ‘the guiding 
principle’ of [Weyl’s] work and also as a ‘bridge’ within group theory” so that “[t]he 
application of group theory to quantum physics depends on the existence of this bridge 
between structures within the former” (French [2000], p. 109). What is doing the work 
here is ‘shared structure’, and not a specific type of shared structure. Thus, even noting 
the fact that both group theory and quantum mechanics were in a state of flux, the 
example does not speak to either the claim that “the partial structures programme 
provides the appropriate formalization of this feature [or openness]” or the claim that 
“what we have in this case is the partial importation of mathematical structures into the 
physical realm which suggests that the appropriate formal characterization of this relation 
is by means of a partial homomorphism” (French [2000], p. 110)  
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(2) In arranging a scientific theory as a hierarchy of models, shared structure between 
models at different levels tells us about the applicability of the models at one 
level to those at another; it can thus tell us, for example, about the applicability of 
theoretical models to data models.  
 
French ([2000], p. 107), for example, discusses Wigner’s use of the shared group-
structure of quantum theoretical models and quantum data models for determining how 
the ‘data’ are to be structured so as to satisfy the fundamental symmetry principles. This 
use speaks to Wigner’s ‘phenomenological’ programme (again, see Mackey [1993]). 
Again, it was not, as French suggests it was, by appeal to a type of structure or type of 
morphism that the analogy between atomic and nuclear systems became useful for 
accounting for the shared group-structure of atomic phenomena: it was because the 
shared Lie-group-structure between models of atomic systems and models of nuclear 
systems supplied an effective analogy for representing the laws of atomic phenomena in 
terms of symmetry principles.  
 
French ([2000], p. 111) writes, however, that the analogy allowed one to see that “[t]he 
decomposition of the Hilbert space for a nucleon into proton and neutron subspaces is 
analogous to the decomposition of the corresponding Hilbert space for the spin of an 
electron… Indeed the relevant groups have isomorphic Lie algebras”. But, even noting 
the fact that idealizations are needed to make this analogy work, this example does not 
speak to either the claim that “[t]hese kinds of idealizing moves can be represented via 
partial isomorphisms holding between the partial structures” (French [2000], p. 112) or 
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the claim that “[t]his incomplete analogy between atomic and nuclear structure can be 
straightforwardly represented in terms of partial structures” (French [2000], p. 112). It is 
the appeal to the appropriate kind of shared structure, e.g., Lie-group structure, that is 
doing the work in the example that French gives, and no further analysis in terms of a 
specific type of structure or morphism is needed to ground the application of this analogy. 
 
(3) When it comes to considering the relationship between predecessor and successor 
theories, shared structure between models of the theory can be used to tell us 
about the continuity of structure across theory change.  
 
Here we take as our example Newtonian versus Special Relativistic mechanics, and in 
order to take the simplest possible case we consider inertial motion in these theories. In 
other words, we compare the inertial structure of Galilean spacetime to that of 
Minkowski spacetime. Both Newtonian and Special Relativistic mechanics satisfy the 
principle of relativity, and this implies that for each theory the coordinate transformations 
between inertial frames must form a group. In the first case we have the Galilean group, 
and, in the second, the inhomogeneous Lorentz group; both the Galilean and Lorentz 
groups of transformations being permutations of R4. The relationship of shared structure 
between Newtonian mechanics and Special Relativity obtains when specific limiting 
conditions26 are imposed within Special Relativity. Under these conditions, the Lorentz 
transformations reduce to the Galilean transformations and so the two theories share the 
same group-structure. 
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So far we have concerned ourselves only with those cases in which shared structure 
between models presents us with the kinds of objects that the theory talks about. 
Importantly distinct is the claim that shared structure gives us the particular objects that 
the theory is about, i.e., the claim that the theory represents particular objects rather than 
merely presents kinds of objects. We now turn to take-up the question of how a scientific 
theory is used to represent, that is, used to establish a ‘theory-world connection’. 
 
4 Beyond the Mathematical Analogy: From Presentation to Representation 
 
In this section we consider, at last, the challenge of establishing how theories connect to 
the world. Viewing this challenge in light of our semantic structuralist characterization of 
a theory, the connection can be broken down into two main components: connecting 
theoretical models to data models, and connecting data models to the phenomena. We 
argue that while the first connection can be accounted for solely in terms of presentation 
of shared structure, the second demands the addition of something more.  
 
In the spirit of Suppes, we again consider a hierarchy consisting of ‘the phenomena’27 at 
the bottom, the high level theory at the top, and various other levels in between. We say 
that the layer above ‘the phenomena’ is the experimental ‘data’ (for example, points on 
paper representing values arrived at by experiments), which we distinguish from the ‘data 
models’ (for example, points on paper with a curve drawn through them representing 
structured data). In other words, in plotting our ‘data’ we present our experimental results 
in a mathematically structured space, and then in constructing a data model we add 
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further structure to the data by relating ‘the points’ to each other such that the relevant 
relations between them can be expressed in a mathematical manner.28 Finally, above the 
data models we have the entire theoretical hierarchy, each layer being characterized by 
the models of the associated theory. (Forthcoming diagram.)  
 
Returning to our initial query of how theoretical models connect to data models and how 
data models connect with the phenomena, we have already seen that the first question is 
straightforwardly answered by appeal to the notion of shared structure. That is, a 
theoretical model applies to a data model just in case, as explained in Section 3, they 
share the appropriate kind of structure and so can be said to talk about the same kinds of 
objects. To answer the second question, however, we need an account of representation: 
we need an account of how a physical theory comes to be about particular objects. 
Appeals to shared structure are not enough for this purpose.  
 
Recall that data models are the lowest level at which we have a theory and its models, 
i.e., a theory of the data and its data models. Data models, then, can be taken as truth-
makers in the Tarskian sense, but if they are to be about the phenomena they must also 
function as representations (see Jones [2005]). Recall, too, that the high level theory 
presents the kinds of objects, so if it is to be connected to the phenomena via data models, 
then one requires an account of how it represents the particular objects that the theory is 
purportedly about. Consequently, to establish a theory-world connection, it is necessary 
to go further than characterizing a theory as a collection of Tarskian models that presents 
the kinds of objects that the theory talks about.29  
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To move from presentation to representation, and so to move from Quine’s semantic ‘is’ 
to an ontological ‘is’30, one needs something more than a minimal scientific 
structuralism. The question of the reality of particular physical objects and/or the truth of 
physical propositions cannot be settled semantically, i.e., cannot be settled merely by 
appeal to a Tarskian notion of a model and/or a Tarskian notion of truth: it depends 
crucially on some extra-semantic process whereby the connection between what we say 
and what there is is both established and justified. This is what we mean when we say 
that an account of representation31 is required. The term ‘model’ in science is, of course, 
replete with connotations of representation and the temptation in the past has perhaps 
been for the semantic view of theories, with its use of Tarskian models (which, to repeat, 
are truth-makers and not representations), to piggy-back on this required representational 
role. In our view this is not acceptable: if the semantic view of theories is to do better 
than the syntactic view in tackling the problem of the theory-world connection, then it 
owes us an account of how its models (Tarskian or otherwise) gain their representational 
significance32. Indeed, as we will now see, it is the differences in how representation is 
treated that lead to the different varieties of scientific structuralism. 
 
What we call minimal structuralism is committed only to the claim that the kinds of 
objects that a theory talks about are presented through the shared structure of its 
theoretical models and that the theory applies to the phenomena just in case the 
theoretical models and the data models share the same kind of structure. No ontological 
commitment – nothing about the nature, individuality or modality of particular objects – 
is entailed. Viewed methodologically, to establish the connection between the theoretical 
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and data models, minimal structuralism considers only the appropriateness of the kind of 
structure and owes us no story connecting data models to the phenomena. In adopting a 
methodological stance, we forgo talk of ‘the structure of the phenomena’ and simply 
begin with data models. We notice that our theoretical models are appropriately 
structured (present objects of the appropriate kind) and shared structure is what does the 
work connecting our data models up through the hierarchy to the theoretical models, and 
so we suggest the methodological strategy of seeking out, exploring and exploiting the 
notion of the appropriate kind of shared structure, both up and down the hierarchy, and 
sideways33 across both different and successive theories.  
 
There are various ways of going beyond this methodologically viewed minimal 
structuralism, depending, in part, on how one wishes to make the theory-world 
connection. That is, depending on how one chooses to close the gap between the data 
models and the phenomena, a theory that presents us with the appropriate kinds of objects 
can also be claimed to represent (the structure of) physical objects in the world. Recall 
that we offered two alternatives to our methodological stance: from an empirical stance, 
one may hold that what structures the phenomena is the high-level theory, whereas from a 
realist stance one may hold that what structures the phenomena is the world. Such 
additional stances are all very well and good, but if we are to be motivated to move 
beyond the more modest methodological stance we need reasons. In particular, if we are 
to adopt either the empiricist or the realist alternative, we need a justification for the 
claim that data models share the same structure as the phenomena and, as a result, that the 
former can be taken as representations of the latter. 
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Adopting a empiricist stance, van Fraassen, as a ‘structural empiricist’, suggests that we 
simply identify the phenomena with the data models: 
the data model … is, as it were, a secondary phenomenon created in the laboratory that 
becomes the primary phenomenon to be saved by the theory. (van Fraassen [2002], 
p.252) 
 
In this way, the step from presentation to representation is made almost trivially: the data 
models act as the ‘phenomena to be saved’ and so all we need to connect the theory to 
data models qua ‘the phenomena’ is a guarantee of their shared structure. van Fraassen 
makes this connection by using embeddability as a guarantee of the shared structure 
between theoretical models and ‘the phenomena’, maintaining that 
certain parts of the [theoretical] models [are] to be identified as empirical substructures, 
and these [are] the candidates for representation of the observable phenomena which 
science can confront within our experience. (van Fraassen [1989], p. 227)  
 
This empiricist version of scientific structuralism avoids the question of why it should be 
assumed that the phenomena is represented by data models by simply collapsing any 
distinction between the two and so offers no justification for why such an identification 
should be presumed possible.  
 
We think it is necessary, for any attempt which aims to move beyond a methodological 
stance, to provide an account of what allows us, in the first place, to make the 
identification between the phenomena and data models34. One such account, which stands 
mid-way between the empiricist and realist option, might arise from some form of 
structurally read neo-Kantianism, whereby the very process of representation (e.g., the 
synthetic unity of apperception) itself structures the phenomena so that the act of 
representation itself explains the possibility (indeed, the necessity) of identifying, in 
terms of their shared structure, the data models and the phenomena.  
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Structural realists, such as French and Ladyman, who adopt a realist stance and so 
presume that the world structures the phenomena, invoke the ‘no miracles’ argument to 
explain the necessity of identifying the structure of data models and the structure of the 
phenomena; it is used to argue that if there was no shared structure between the (data 
models of the) theory and the world (the phenomena) the success of science would be a 
miracle. Thus, while no detailed account of how the data models come to share structure 
with the phenomena is given, the possibility (again, necessity) of making the 
identification is itself justified by appeal to at least an argument.35   
 
Structural realism, insofar as it identifies the structure of data models and the structure of 
the phenomena, is in all its forms, committed to the claim that the kinds of objects 
presented by our theory accurately represent the structure of particular objects of which 
‘the world’ is claimed to consist. The forms of structural realism differ in just how far this 
representation is claimed to take us. The epistemological structural realist says that, with 
respect to the particular objects, all that can be known is that they are instances of the 
structural kinds given by our theories; all that can be known is their structure36. They 
remain open to the possibility, however, that the particular objects in the world have other 
properties that are not represented by the theory. Ontological structural realism can be 
understood as rejecting this last claim and asserting that the particular objects in the 
world have no properties beyond those that make them instances of certain structural 
kinds; all there is is structure37.  
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Ladyman, however, is developing an alternative form of ontological structural realism 
which he terms ‘modal structural realism’.38 Adopting this modal stance, one may say 
that the ‘structural kinds’ specify only the modal properties associated with what it is for 
a particular object to be an instance of that kind. To explain what might be meant here we 
again take an example from mathematics: it may be said that while 2∈4 is a possible 
property of the natural numbers it is not a structural, i.e., a necessary, property because 
2∈4 is not true in all models that have a Natural-Number structure. Modal structural 
realism is, therefore, at once both more modest and more ambitious than other varieties of 
structural realism. Unlike the standard ontological version, it does not aim to capture all 
the properties of particular physical objects, but it does aim to capture their necessary 
properties. The modal properties transfer, via shared structure, to the particular instances 
of the kind, thus representing the modal relations between particulars.  
 
Once again, what we seem to be missing is an account of why this representation works, 
e.g., an account of why the structural properties of kinds of objects can be identified with 
the necessary properties of particular objects. Indeed, as with standard structural realism, 
the claim that structural properties play a representational role at all is justified entirely 
by appeal to the ‘no miracles argument’. As minimal scientific structuralists, we eschew 
this representational role; we accept that if (models of) scientific theories present us with 
kinds of objects, then all that can be known of objects, as instances of those kinds, is their 
structure. But, in adopting a methodological stance, we remain open to the possibility 
(epistemic, ontic or modal) that particular objects may have properties that are not 
structured by how we present them. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
We have made use of an analogy with mathematical structuralism in order to characterize 
what we call minimal scientific structuralism. On this account: 
 
• A theory is characterized by the collection of its models, and the kinds of objects that 
the theory talks about are presented through the shared structure of those models. 
• The applicability of the high level theory to the low level data is expressed in terms of 
the shared structure between their models.  
• A relationship of structural continuity between predecessor and successor theories is 
expressed in terms of the shared structure between the models of the two theories.  
 
No further analyses are needed for meeting the challenges facing the minimal scientific 
structuralist – by appealing to the shared structure of models we can characterize 
scientific theories in ‘structural’ terms, and use this characterization to explain the role of 
models in accounts of applicability, and to address the relationship of ‘structural 
continuity’ between predecessor and successor theories. In particular, we need no 
analyses in terms of specific types of morphisms or specific types of ‘structure’. To 
account, however, for the connection between the theory and the world one must move 
past minimal scientific structuralism; here the issue of representation becomes crucial and 
so more than a methodological stance must be adopted. Just how such representation is to 
be accomplished and what justification we might give for believing that it is, is what 
divides scientific structuralism into its different varieties.  
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The empirical stance, taken by van Fraassen, simply asserts the identity of the data 
models and the phenomena. The neo-Kantian option, as one might reconstruct it from the 
writings of, say, Poinçare, has yet to be worked out in any informative way. And finally, 
the realist stance, adopted by the structural realist, offers only the ‘no miracles’ argument 
as evidence for the claim that the structure of the data models is shared by the structure of 
the phenomena. In any case, neither the framework of the semantic view of theories nor 
the appeal to shared structure alone offers the scientific structuralist a quick route to 
representation.  
 
As things stand, without the needed justification, we advocate adopting a methodological 
stance towards a minimal construal of both scientific structuralism and structural realism; 
we embrace the strategy of seeking out, exploring and exploiting the notion of the 
appropriate kind of shared structure, both up and down the hierarchy, and sideways 
across models of the same, different, and successive theories. Of course, to account for 
the success of scientific representation, one can chose to take whatever additional stance 
one likes, but a stance itself is not a justification.  
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
1 Discussions of structuralism in the philosophy of science literature have, quite naturally, centered on those 
sciences, like physics, that are formulated in mathematical terms; ours will do the same. 
2 For example, supporters of syntactic view sought to use their characterization of a scientific theory, as a 
partially interpreted calculus together with correspondence rules, to establish a theory-world connection in 
terms of their shared ‘logical structure’. Those advancing the semantic view, as set-out by, say, Suppes, 
wherein a theory is a collection of (Tarskian) models, sought to likewise use their characterization to 
establish a theory-world connection but in terms their shared ‘set-structure’, i.e., in terms of the 
isomorphisms between their respective models. 
3 Note that we have changed the slogan of mathematical structuralism from ‘mathematics is about 
structures and their morphology’ to ‘mathematics is about structured systems and their morphology’. This 
shift reflects our view that the aim of the structuralist is to account for the shared structure of systems, as 
opposed to answering such questions as: “What is a structure?” or “What kind/type of system is constitutive 
of what a structure is?”. We thus adopt an in re, as opposed to an ante rem, interpretation of both 
mathematical and scientific structuralism. (See Landry and Marquis [2005] for more on this distinction.) 
4 Our use of the term ‘frame’ is intended to accord with Hilbert’s claim that “… it is certainly obvious that 
every theory is only a scaffolding or schema of concepts together with their necessary relations to one 
another, and that the basic elements can be though of in any way one likes. …. One only needs to apply a 
reversible one-one transformation and lay it down that the axioms shall be correspondingly the same for all 
transformed things”. (Hilbert [1899], pp. 40-41) And too our use of the term ‘system’ is to be understood in 
light of Hilbert’s use of the term ‘axiom system’, as implemented in his Grundlagen. Bernays best sums 
this use as follows: “[we understand] the assertions (theorems) of the axiomatized theory in a hypothetical 
sense, that is, as holding true for any interpretation… for which the axioms are satisfied. Thus, an axiom 
system is regarded not as a system of statements about a subject matter but as a system of conditions for 
what might be called a relational structure”. (Bernays [1967], p. 497)  
5 The use of the term ‘concrete’ is meant to indicate that there are two levels of mathematical structuralism. 
One that considers concrete mathematical systems (e.g., models) as instances (e.g., interpretations) of the 
same kind of structured system and one that considers abstract mathematical systems as instances of the 
same type of structured system. In the philosophy of mathematics literature the former is known as model-
structuralism, while the latter is know as pure or abstract-structuralism. (See Hale [1996]) For example, at 
the concrete level, one could, as explained above, consider some set-structured systems as instances of the 
same kind (as isomorphic models) of the Natural-Number structure. At the abstract level, in contrast, one 
could consider, à la Bourbaki, all group-structured systems as instances of the same type, for example, as 
instances of the same type of set-structured system. For our purposes, we will limit our focus to concrete 
structured systems, or simply, to models. (See Landry and Marquis [2005] for a detailed discussion of the 
levels, varieties and interpretations of mathematical structuralism.) 
6 That is, a model of a set of sentences (where ‘a set of sentences’ is understood as ‘a system of conditions’ 
in Bernays’ sense above) is an interpretation of a formalized language for which that set of sentences is 
true. 
7 In reference, then, to Benacerraf [1965], mathematical structuralism at this concrete level implies that 
there are no numbers as particular objects, i.e., as independently existing things whose ‘essence’ can be 
individuated independently of the role they play in a structured system of a given kind. There are, in our 
terminology, only numbers as kinds of objects, i.e., there are ‘objects’ that can be individuated, only up to 
isomorphism, as positions in a given kind of structured system. 
8 See Dummett [1991], p. 295 for a discussion of the problems of taking either ‘structured system’ or 
‘model’ to mean ‘structure’. While Dummett’s analysis here is, in some sense, helpful, it confuses abstract 
and pure accounts of structuralism (again, see Hale [1996]), i.e., it confuses accounts that presume that 
abstract structures as themselves kinds of objects must be presented as positions in (higher) types of 
abstract structured systems with accounts that presume that abstract structures, as independently existing 
objects, must be “made up” of abstractly considered concrete kinds of objects, like sets. As already 
explained, structured systems qua models can be used to account for the shared structure of a concrete kind 
of structured system, e.g., for the shared structure of the elements and/or properties of natural numbers qua 
set-structured systems. However, at an abstract level, structured systems qua schematic types can also be 
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used to account for the shared structure of abstract kinds of structured systems. (See Landry and Marquis 
[2005] for a discussion of these issues and for what is meant by considering a structured system, at an 
abstract level, as a schematic type.) 
9 To say that the axioms provide a framework is not intended to be read as the ‘formalist’ claim that a 
theory ought to be viewed syntactically as an empty form or an uninterpreted calculus devoid of content. 
One could equally interpret this semantically; one could say that, though framed by its axioms, a theory is 
characterized by the collection of all its isomorphic models, i.e., by the collection of all its concrete 
structured systems that have the same kind of structure. So, for the mathematical structuralist, there need be 
no sharp divide between the syntactic and semantic view of theories. One must thus keep distinct the 
structuralist claim, that a mathematical theory is about a kind of object from both the formalist claim that a 
mathematical theory is about contentless form and the essentialist/Fregean claim that a mathematical theory 
is about independently existing (particular) objects. (See also Benacerraf’s [1965], pp. 285-292, distinction 
between the formalist, the Fregean, and what he calls the ‘formist’.) 
10 Note that these “conditions of coherence” need not be formally specified, e.g., they need not be analysed, 
as Hilbert desired, in terms of a logical notion of consistency, or an in terms of an axiomatic notion of 
coherence (Shapiro [1997]), but rather, may be taken as more in line with Gödel [1947], p. 477, who 
forgoes their formal analysis in terms of, say, “intrinsically necessary” in favor of more informal notions 
like success, fruitfulness, simplicity, etc. 
11 To remain agnostic about whether and/or how such representations need ‘save the phenomena’ or ‘get a 
hold on reality’, i.e., to remain agnostic about whether and/or how theories, to be successful, need be 
‘empirically adequate’ or ‘true’, we leave the notion of success as unanalyzed.  
12 See Da Costa, Bueno and French, [1997] 
13 We say may forego such axiomatization since not all accounts of the semantic view do this. For example, 
both Suppes [1957; 1960; 1962], and Da Costa, French [1990] presume that a theory, even if characterized 
by its models, must be framed by a set-theoretic axiomatization/predicate. Yet, for the purposes of 
accounting for applicability, Suppes claims that “[t]he important distinction that we shall need is that a 
theory is a linguistic entity consisting of a set of sentences and models are non-linguistic entities in which 
the theory is satisfied (an exact definition of theories is also not necessary for our uses here)”. (Suppes, 
[1960], p. 290) 
14 Clearly, the syntactic view of theories also admits talk of models; the crucial difference is that, for 
advocates of the syntactic approach, a theory is an axiomatic system (or set of sentences) plus 
correspondence rules and so its models (interpretations that make the set of sentences true) have only a 
mediate role to play in establishing the theory-world connection; even if models are used to interpret 
theoretical (and, perhaps observational) sentences, there still remains a gap between the types of sentences 
and so correspondence rules are needed to fill this gap. 
15 For accounts of a scientific theory as a family of structures see van Fraassen [1980] and French, [1999; 
2000]. 
16 The use of such a structuralist view of a mathematical theory for presenting scientific theories is well 
expressed by Weyl [1949], pp. 25-27: “…[a mathematical theory as] an axiom system is a logical mold of 
possible sciences… A science can determine its domain of investigation up to an isomorphic mapping. In 
particular it remains quite indifferent as to the “essence” of its objects…”. It is this point that speaks against 
Psillos’ [1995; 2001; 2005] position that a structuralist (or structural realist) cannot separate structure/form 
from nature/content. It is not that the structuralist is committed to denying that objects have an essence/a 
nature/content, it is that he, when presenting them mathematically, remains indifferent to such and so places 
his focus on their shared kind of structure. It is, in part, this point that we intend to capture by claiming that 
an object so presented is a kind of object and not a particular. 
17 Note that, to allow for talk of surplus structure, in the sense of Redhead [1980], we have changed to 
talking about shared structure. That is, while models of a mathematical theory have the same kind of 
structure, models of a physical theory, in so far as they are ‘mathematical models’ (again in the sense of 
Redhead), might have more structure than the kind needed to apply to the objects that the physical theory is 
intended to talk about. So the mathematical and physical models share a kind of structure in that the latter is 
embeddable in the former.  
18 See Suppes [1962] for a description of the “criteria of evaluation” and, particularly, see p. 259 for a list of 
the “typical problems” associated with each. 
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19 See Suppes’ [1967], p. 59 claim that “[t]he definition of isomorphism of models in the given context 
makes the intuitive idea of same structure precise”. In an earlier work [1960] Suppes also states that once 
the [empirical] theory is axiomatized within a standard set-theoretical framework, the mathematical 
methods of using “representation theorems” and “embedding theorems” to capture facts about 
isomorphisms can be extended from mathematics to the empirical sciences.  
20 Van Fraassen makes a similar distinction, viz., “the point long emphasized by Patrick Suppes that the 
theory is not confronted with the raw data [again, what we call the phenomena] but with models of the data, 
and the construction of [the theory of] these data models is a sophisticated and creative process”. (van 
Fraassen [1989], p.229) However, he then collapses this distinction by claiming that models of data are “the 
dress in which the debutante phenomena make their debut” (Ibid.). This identification of data models and 
phenomena will be further considered in section 4.  
21 See French [2000], p. 116-117 for his distinction between the empiricist and realist stance.  
22 See Worrall [1989], p. 148 for a further discussion of how Newtonian and Einsteinian gravitational 
theories directly contradict each other in important respects. 
23 See Da Costa, Bueno, French, [1997], p. 276 
24 Da Costa, Chuaqui [1988], Da Costa, French [1990] and Da Costa, Bueno, French, [1997], all seek to 
provide such accounts; they seek to provide an abstract analysis of what a structure is, and insofar as a 
theory is a family of structure, to thereby provide an abstract analysis of what theory is, by analyzing both 
in set-theoretic terms. This, as explicitly claimed in Da Costa, French [1990], so as to be in-line with both 
Bourbaki’s set-theoretic account of mathematical structuralism wherein a kind of structure is a type of set-
structured system and Suppes’ [1957; 1960; 1962] slogan that “To axiomatize a theory is to define a set-
theoretical predicate” (p. 249). 
25 This is a simplification. Using solutions to the the two-body problem to characterize the kind ‘Newtonian 
inertial-gravitational’ is problematic because the two-body problem is a special case, the n-body problem 
not being soluble in general. This does not, however, affect the principle by which the shared structure of 
solutions is related to kinds of objects. 
26 That is, we require that the relative speed between the two frames of reference is much less than the 
speed of light, and that the distance between the two observers, each at rest with respect to their respective 
coordinate systems, is small. 
27 We will have more to say shortly on the differences of what is meant by ‘the phenomena’. 
28 Of course, a great deal of both theoretical and experimental work needs to be done in order to arrive at 
the data models, but this is not what we are concerned with here. Nor is our concern with the particular 
strategies of how we ‘structure’ the data (e.g.,. bottom-up, top-down, or even boot-strapping strategies). 
While no doubt (as Cartwright, Suarez, Giere, etc., have pointed out) such strategic investigations are  
necessary for the practical problem of constructing the hierarchy, we can nevertheless, once this hierarchy 
is so constructed, place the theoretical hierarchy above the data models and so consider the connection 
between a theory and the data models. 
29 To appreciate the same point, though expressed differently, see Giere’s [1995] discussion of why 
Tarskian semantics is not appropriate for the representational role of models of physical theories. Note, too 
that even though Ladyman [1998] accepts that the semantic view is the most appropriate frame for the 
structural realist position, he agrees with Giere that Tarskian semantics cannot do the job of closing the gap 
between the theory and the world. As well, while Ladyman favors the use of the notion of partial 
isomorphism over Giere’s notion of similarity to account for the shared structure of theoretical and data 
models, he further agrees with Giere that “that once the semantic approach is adopted the crucial issue is 
whether or not theoretical models tell us about modalities” (Ladyman [1998], p. 416.). We will have more 
to say about Ladyman’s modal stance in Section 4.  
30 By the ontological ‘is’ we do not mean the metaphysical ‘is’ that ranges over the noumena; we are happy 
for this ‘is’ to range over just the phenomena, and too we allow for the phenomena be observable or 
unobservable. That is, we take no stand on the Kantian realism/idealism debate or the realism/constructive 
empiricism/instrumentalism debates. 
31 Taking this challenge to close the gap between theories and the world as being met by an account of truth 
(as opposed to being met by an account of representation) that would serve to fill-out the Tarskian notion of 
truth and so lend itself to the realist-empiricist debate, Da Costa and French [1990], p. 251 note various 
approaches that appeal to additional aspects of truth that can then be used to close this gap, e.g., Putnam’s 
warranted assertability criterion, Fine’s NOA, and their own pragmatic position. In contrast to such truth-
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seeking approaches, examples of representational approaches include Giere [1988], van Fraassen [1989], 
and Hugh’s [1999] supposition that ‘theoretical hypotheses’ provide the needed representational bridge by 
asserting some sort of correspondence (e.g., similarity or isomorphism) between the physical system under 
investigation and some part of at least one of the theoretical models. Such representational approaches also 
include accounts, like Cartwright et al, [1995], which seek to begin with phenomenological models and 
build-up representational relations by, for example, foregoing notions of similarity or isomorphism (see 
Suarez [2003]), and instead considering the inference patterns amongst these and theoretical models (see 
Suarez [2005]).  
32 Indeed, one could argue that at least the logical positivists saw the need for such even if their notion of 
cognitive significance was not up to the task. 
33 See Bokulich’s [2004] for an excellent account of how analyses of horizontal models, i.e., models that 
are developed by way of analogy with models of a neighbouring theory (p. 623), are just as significant for 
picking out the appropriate kind of structure as are models of the theory and/or models of the data.  
34 van Fraassen’s perspectival ‘I’ may be seen as providing the underpinning for such an account but how 
and/or why this relates to a structural account of science is left unanswered. That is, even if ‘first-person’ 
philosophy is called for, it must be explained how/why this then allows us to identify phenomena with data 
models; what notion of identity is called into play here? 
35 In contrast, in the neo-Kantian case, shared structure between the data models and the phenomena is a 
consequence of the representation being so constructed; it is not the basis upon which representation is 
achieved.  
36 Epistemic structural realism is more in line with the neo-Kantian option; it says nothing about the way 
the world is structured, but rather concerns itself with how we come to know its structure, i.e., it says we 
come to know the world by the structure of the phenomena. 
37 Notice, then, that while structuralism (which is about kinds of objects) does not imply relationalism 
(which is about particular objects, and claims that they are entirely characterized by their relations to one 
another), ontological structural realism (as characterized above) is committed to both. 
38 See Ladyman’s [1998], p. 418 claim that “the abstract mathematical structures it [the theoretical parts of 
a theory] employs … must have some grip on reality. It is clear that the ‘grip on reality’ in question must 
go beyond a correct description of the actual phenomena to the representation of modal relations between 
them”. Further detail of Ladyman’s modal account was provided at the Structuralism in Physics workshop, 
in Florence 2003. See also Saunders [1993], p. 320, who suggestively remarks that “it has long been 
apparent that no workable account of nomological necessity can be made out at the level of unstructured 
particulars (except in the context of an unfathomable and antiquated notion of the ‘rule of law’)”. 
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